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STANDING UP FOR THEIR DATA: RECOGNIZING THE
TRUE NATURE OF INJURIES IN DATA BREACH
CLAIMS TO AFFORD PLAINTIFFS ARTICLE III
STANDING
Andrew Braunstein*
Over the last several years, data breaches have become
increasingly more common, due in no small part to the failures of
organizations charged with storing and protecting personal data.
Consumers whose data has fallen victim to these breaches are
more often turning to federal courts in attempts to be made whole
from the loss of their information, whether simple credit card
information or, as breaches become more sophisticated, social
security information, medical and financial records, and more.
These consumers are often being turned away from the courthouse,
however, due to a failure of many federal courts to find that the
plaintiffs have Article III standing to pursue claims.
Many of the district courts hearing data breach claims have
refused to grant standing because of their interpretation of a
recent case addressing constitutional standing, Clapper v.
Amnesty International. These courts have concluded that Clapper
represents a “tightening” of the traditional standing test under
which data breach plaintiffs’ claims that they will suffer harm are
too speculative. These courts are misguided in their analyses.
First, the Supreme Court’s decision in Clapper was based on
an especially rigorous application of the traditional standing test
due to constitutional and national security concerns present in the
case. Data breach claims should not be subject to this same level
*J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2016; B.A. in Government & Politics,
The University of Maryland, 2013. The author thanks the Journal of Law and
Policy staff and editors for their insight and guidance throughout the note
writing process. He thanks his family and friends for their continued support and
encouragement during the note writing process and much more.
94 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
of rigor. Second, these district courts are misreading Clapper to
require a demonstration of an injury in data breach cases that is
not necessary. These courts are looking for some type of
quantifiable injury stemming from the data breach when all that
Clapper requires is a demonstration that the plaintiffs’ data was
lost in the breach. Courts should subscribe to this more accurate
application of the standing test and of Clapper to grant data
breach plaintiffs the day in court to which they are entitled.
INTRODUCTION
In late October of 2014, a group of hackers known as the
“Guardians of Peace” breached Sony Pictures’ computer network
and stole thousands of confidential documents and emails.1 The
group was purportedly working with the North Korean government
and breached Sony’s network as retaliation for the planned release
of The Interview, a satirical comedy imagining and depicting the
assassination of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.2 The
Guardians of Peace gradually released its trove of stolen
documents to the media and threatened more serious action if the
film was released as scheduled.3 In response, Sony canceled the
film’s release.4 This decision garnered widespread criticism from
many in the entertainment industry, the news media, and even
President Barack Obama who stated that Sony “made a mistake”
1 Andrea Peterson, The Sony Pictures Hack, Explained, WASH. POST: THE
SWITCH (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/
wp/2014/12/18/the-sony-pictures-hack-explained/.
2 Id.; see also Peter Travers, The Interview, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 24,
2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/movies/reviews/the-interview-20141224.
3 The hackers even went as far as to promise that theaters showing the film
would “remember the 11th of September 2001.” Kory Grow, U.S. Says North
Korea Was ‘Centrally Involved’ in Sony Hack, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 17, 2014),
http://www.rollingstone.com/movies/news/u-s-says-north-korea-was-centrally-
involved-in-sony-hack-20141217; see also Peterson, supra note 1 (“[M]essages
purported to be from the hackers alluded to ‘The Interview’ . . . explicitly
mentioning the film while invoking the Sept. 11, 2011, terrorist attacks and
threatening theaters that planned to show the film.”).
4 Grow, supra note 3.
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by cancelling the film’s release.5 Sony ultimately decided to
release The Interview in select theaters on Christmas Day6 and also
to distribute the film via streaming services such as iTunes,
YouTube, and Google Play.7 The threats of further action turned
out to be unfounded and the consequences from the breach were
mostly limited to the release of stolen information. The media
focused its attention primarily on emails and other documents that
offered a glimpse into the inner-workings of Hollywood.8
However, the truly damaging information that was released was
5 Daniel Kreps, Barack Obama: Sony Made ‘A Mistake’ Canceling ‘The
Interview,’ ROLLING STONE (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com
/movies/news/barack-obama-sony-mistake-canceling-the-interview-20141219;
see also Travers, supra note 2 (“Prompted by free-speech advocates from
George Clooney to President Obama, Sony has semi-reversed itself and set a
limited U.S. theatrical release for The Interview in a few hundred independent
cinemas.”).
6 Travers, supra note 2; Jordan Chariton, ‘The Interview’ to Stream on
YouTube, Google Play, Xbox in Unique Sony Release, WRAP (Dec. 24, 2014),
http://www.thewrap.com/sony-youtube-interview-streaming-deal-in-the-works-
report/.
7 Chariton, supra note 6.
8 Some of the most highly publicized documents were lists of executives’
and celebrities’ salaries and email exchanges disparaging celebrities and other
public figures. For example, a spreadsheet was released listing the salaries of
seventeen top executives at Sony Pictures Entertainment. Ted Johnson, Sony
Bosses’ Alleged Salaries Leak Online Amid Hacking Fallout, VARIETY (Dec. 1,
2014), http://variety.com/2014/biz/news/sony-bosses-alleged-salaries-leak-onlin
e-amid-hacking-fallout-1201368419/. Another document contained a twenty-
five page list of executive complaints about the way Sony Pictures was
managed, including complaints that “upper management allow[ed] certain talent
and filmmakers to bleed [the company] dry with their outlandish requests for
private jets, wardrobe and grooming stylists,” and concessions that Sony has
faltered because it keeps “making the same, safe, soul-less movies and TV
shows.” Sam Biddle, Sony Hack Reveals 25-Page List of Reasons it Sucks to
Work at Sony, GAWKER (Dec. 3, 2014), http://gawker.com/sony-hack-reveals-
25-page-list-of-reasons-it-sucks-to-w-1666264634. Arguably the most
embarrassing (and widely circulated) emails were those between top Sony
executives in which they insult various actors—for example, calling Kevin Hart
a “whore” and Angelina Jolie a “minimally talented spoiled brat”—and even
President Obama, making racially-based jokes about his taste in films. Katie
Richards, The 5 Most Embarrassing Revelations From Sony’s Sprawling Hack,
ADWEEK (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding
/5-most-embarrassing-revelations-sonys-sprawling-hack-161937.
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the “names, addresses, Social Security numbers, employment
records, medical history, and financial information of more than
47,000 current and former Sony employees and associates.”9
This dissemination was especially detrimental, not only
because of its scale, but also because of the type of information
involved. Though information such as names, addresses, and email
addresses are typically already available to advertisers and other
organizations, the combination of that information with
employment records, medical records, financial records, and Social
Security numbers can be especially harmful.10 Almost immediately
after the breach, the affected employees turned to the courts to
remedy the damage caused by the loss of their information.11 The
plaintiffs’ case seemed strong, not only because the type of data
taken was especially valuable, but also because there were many
indications that Sony was negligent, or at least careless, in properly
safeguarding the information.12
Sony had suffered a similar data breach in 2011, during which
hackers released the information of millions of subscribers to its
PlayStation network.13 The plaintiffs that lost their data in the 2014
breach claimed that Sony did not do enough to strengthen its
networks after the earlier attack and, consequently, the risk of
9 Anne Bucher, Sony Pictures Hit With 2 More Data Hack Class Action
Lawsuits, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Dec. 19, 2014), http://topclassactions.com/law
suit-settlements/lawsuit-news/46162-sony-pictures-hit-2-data-hack-class-action-
lawsuits/.
10 See Jordan Robertson, Here’s Why Your Social Security Number Is Holy
Grail for Hackers, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.bloo
mberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-05/here-s-why-your-social-security-number-
is-holy-grail-for-hackers.
11 Seven different class action lawsuits have been filed against Sony. 7
Sony Data Breach Class Action Lawsuits May Be Merged, TOP CLASS ACTIONS
(Jan. 20, 2015), http://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/479
12-7-sony-data-breach-class-action-lawsuits-may-merged/.
12 Kashmir Hill, Sony Pictures Hack Was a Long Time Coming, Say
Former Employees, FUSION (Dec. 4, 2014), http://fusion.net/story/31469/sony-
pictures-hack-was-a-long-time-coming-say-former-employees/; see also Ralph
Ellis, Lawsuits Say Sony Pictures Should Have Expected Security Breach, CNN
(Dec. 24, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/20/us/sony-pictures-lawsuits/
(“Sony was negligent because it didn’t prepare for a massive cyberattack despite
warnings and previous security breaches.”).
13 Ellis, supra note 12.
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another breach had been foreseeable.14 Moreover, the plaintiffs
(and other reports) alleged that Sony did not act reasonably in
securing the data on its networks.15 For example, its information
security team consisted of only eleven employees at the time of the
breach, eight of whom were employed at the managerial or
executive level.16 Even more shockingly, the hackers gained
significant access after finding an unprotected folder labeled
“Passwords” that contained documents, spreadsheets, and PDF’s
containing thousands of passwords to computers on Sony’s internal
network.17 The hackers also gained access to nearly one million
customer records after exploiting a well-known and basic loophole
that Sony had left open.18 Despite the apparent strength of these
claims on their merits, many of the plaintiffs have run up against
the same obstacle that data breach plaintiffs have repeatedly faced:
the burden of demonstrating that the harm they suffered is
sufficient to maintain Article III standing.19 This Note addresses
how misapplication of the standing doctrine has become one of the
most common barriers faced by those seeking a remedy for the loss
of their personal information after a breach.
Part I of the Note examines the current landscape of the
problem and how both the instances and scale of data breaches
have increased dramatically over recent years. This part also
examines some potential causes of this increase and explores
several legal courses of action taken to remedy the problem and
compensate victims. Part II discusses how the standing doctrine
14 See id.
15 Id.
16 Hill, supra note 12.
17 Adam Clark Estes, The Sony Hack Gets Even Worse as Thousands of
Passwords Leak, GIZMODO (Dec. 4, 2014, 12:25 PM), http://gizmodo.com/sony-
pictures-hack-keeps-getting-worse-thousands-of-pa-1666761704.
18 See Herb Weisbaum, What’s With All These $#@& Data Breaches?,
NBC NEWS, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43499438/ns/business-consumer_news
/t/whats-all-these-data-breaches/#.VGIwzL6Qb0s (last visited Sept. 25, 2015).
19 Paul A. Ferrillo, Court: Neiman Marcus Customers Have Standing to
Bring Putative Class Action Over Data Breach, CYBER RISKNETWORK (July 28,
2015), http://www.cyberrisknetwork.com/2015/07/28/court-neiman-marcus-cust
omers-have-standing-to-bring-putative-class-action-over-data-breach/ (“To date,
standing has been a significant hurdle facing consumers trying to bring massive
putative class action lawsuits after data breaches . . . .”).
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was applied in data breach claims by courts prior to Clapper with
varying results. Part III addresses a recent seminal case in standing
law, Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,20 and examines how
that case has resulted in an often stricter application of the standing
test which has made it more difficult for data breach plaintiffs to
obtain standing.21 Finally, Part IV argues that courts have widely
misapplied Clapper to data breach claims. Many district courts that
have heard recent data breach claims have relied heavily on
Clapper and have held that that data breach plaintiffs lacked
standing, citing a stricter standing test derived from the Supreme
Court’s decision in that case.22 These courts have concluded that
the injuries alleged by data breach plaintiffs are too speculative to
justify standing under Clapper.23 However, as this Note argues,
these courts have misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s holding in
Clapper and have overlooked crucial distinctions between that case
and data breach claims.
This Note argues that Clapper did not impose a stricter
standing test, but instead merely presented a stricter application of
the traditional test due to the unique circumstances surrounding the
case. Furthermore, this Note contends that district courts that have
relied on Clapper to deny data breach plaintiffs standing have
based their decisions on a misguided analysis of that case. The
Court in Clapper denied standing based on a plaintiff’s failure to
show that it would be subjected to government surveillance.24
Subsequent courts have used this reasoning to deny standing to
data breach plaintiffs who fail to show some financial or
20 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
21 See Ferrillo, supra note 19; Does Clapper Silence Data Breach
Litigation? A Two-Year Retrospective, INFO. L. GROUP (Feb. 25, 2015),
http://www.infolawgroup.com/2015/02/articles/breach-notice/does-clapper-silen
ce-data-breach-litigation-a-two-year-retrospective/.
22 See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 660
(S.D. Ohio 2014); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 31
(D.D.C. 2014); Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 879,
882 (N.D. Ill. 2014); In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-CV-8617,
2013 WL 4759588, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013).
23 See, e.g., Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 651–53; In re Sci. Applications
Int’l Corp., 45 F. Supp. 3d at 28; Strautins, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 876; In re Barnes
& Noble Pin Pad Litig., 2013 WL 4759588, at *2.
24 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1152.
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quantifiable harm resulting from a data breach.25 These courts have
used Clapper to hold that injury resulting from a data breach is
likewise too speculative to support standing.26
These decisions have overlooked an important distinction,
however. The Clapper Court denied standing because the plaintiffs
could not prove that they were subjected to surveillance in the first
place; not because they could not show that they suffered or were
likely to suffer some adverse effect from the surveillance.27 In
most data breach cases, however, it is uncontested that the
plaintiffs’ data was wrongfully accessed in a breach.28 Any further
inquiry into whether that loss led to any additional damage is
irrelevant under Clapper. This Note argues that courts deciding
data breach cases should limit their standing inquiry to whether or
not information was lost in the data breach. This Note concludes
that data breach victims can demonstrate injury sufficient enough
to maintain standing by simply proving the loss of their data.
I. THE INCREASING PROBLEM OFDATA BREACHES
A. The Recent Rise of Data Breaches29
While the publicity surrounding Sony’s data breach captured
the public’s attention, similar types of breaches have been
25 See, e.g., Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 657.
26 E.g., id. at 655.
27 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1152 (“[R]espondents do not face a threat of
certainly impending interception . . . .”) (emphasis added).
28 See, e.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir.
2015) (“Clapper was addressing speculative harm based on something that may
not even have happened to some or all of the plaintiffs. In our case, Neiman
Marcus does not contest the fact that the initial breach took place.”).
29 There are differing opinions on what constitutes a “data breach.” Byron
Acohido, What Is a ‘Data Breach’ Really? CREDIT.COM (Nov. 6, 2014),
http://blog.credit.com/2014/11/what-is-a-data-breach-really-100639/. For the
purpose of consistency throughout this Note, the term “data breach(es)” refers
to, “generally, an impermissible use or disclosure [of electronically stored
Personal Identification Information (PII)] that compromises the security or
privacy of the protected . . . information.” Breach Notification Rule, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/
breach-notification /index.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2015).
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commonplace for years and unfortunately are becoming even more
prevalent. Since 2005, more than 534 million personal records
have been lost as a result of data breaches.30 In 2014 alone there
were 579 separate data breaches and experts predict this number
will only rise “as consumers become more dependent on Internet-
connected devices.”31 The actual number of breaches is likely even
higher because security experts generally agree that most breaches
are never reported to the public.32
Although many of these breaches have involved the
dissemination of credit card numbers or basic personal identifiable
information (“PII”) like names, addresses, email addresses, and
phone numbers, the more serious breaches are those in which
information such as Social Security numbers, bank account
numbers, or medical records, is involved.33 When a credit card
number is stolen, the affected consumers simply need to report the
incident and order a new card from their bank.34 The banks and
credit card companies reimburse customers for any fraudulent
charges.35 Also, in most cases advertisers, data brokers, and other
parties already have access to many consumers’ basic PII.36 On the
other hand, when more sophisticated PII is accessed and
wrongfully disseminated, the effects can be incredibly damaging.
30 Weisbaum, supra note 18.
31 Sarah Halzack, Home Depot and JP Morgan Are Doing Fine. Is it a Sign
We’re Numb to Data Breaches?, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/get-there/wp/2014/10/06/home-depot-and
-jpmorgan-are-doing-fine-is-it-a-sign-were-numb-to-data-breaches/.
32 Weisbaum, supra note 18.
33 See Robertson, supra note 10.
34 Dealing with Credit Card Fraud or Identity Theft, BANK AM.,
https://www.bankofamerica.com/credit-cards/education/dealing-with-credit-card
-fraud.go (last visited Sept. 25, 2015).
35 The Fair Credit Billing Act (15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1974)) caps
liability for unauthorized credit card charges at $50. Disputing Credit Card
Charges, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Aug. 2012), http://www.consumer
.ftc.gov/articles/0219-disputing-credit-card-charges.
36 For example, data brokers sell to advertisers information as broad as
“marital status, income, job, shopping habits, travel plans and a host of other
factors.” Getting to Know You, ECONOMIST (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.
economist.com/news/special-report/21615871-everything-people-do-online-avid
ly-followed-advertisers-and-third-party.
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For example, the theft of one woman’s Social Security number
allowed the thief to obtain a driver’s license, passport, and bank
account in the victim’s name.37 The thief also committed several
felonies in the woman’s name, impacting her ability to find
employment.38
Though these types of sophisticated breaches that involve more
than simple credit card information are less often publicized than
large-scale retail breaches, they occur more frequently and often
involve more valuable information.39 For example, in one of the
largest recorded breaches, Chinese hackers attacked the servers of
Community Health Systems, one of the nation’s largest hospital
chains, and stole 4.5 million patients’ “names, addresses, birth
dates, telephone numbers and Social Security numbers.”40 This is
only one example in an alarming string of recent data breaches
affecting the healthcare industry.41 Since the Department of Health
and Human Services enacted reporting requirements in 2009 as
part of a health record digitization effort, there have been 944
recorded incidents of data breaches involving the records of more
than 30 million people.42
Other organizations outside the healthcare industry have also
become targets for their valuable data over recent years. In fact, in
a 2014 study of American companies, forty-three percent of
37 Weisbaum, supra note 18.
38 Id.
39 Between 2005 and September 2015, there were 4,533 breaches involving
information other than payment cards and only 65 breaches where credit or debit
card information was disseminated. Chronology of Data Breaches: Custom Sort,
PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach/ (last
visited Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter Chronology of Data Breaches].
40 Jim Finkle & Caroline Humer, Community Health Says Data Stolen in
Cyber Attack from China, REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.reuters.com
/article/2014/08/18/us-community-health-cybersecurity-
idUSKBN0GI16N20140818.
41 Jason Millman, Health Care Data Breaches Have Hit 30M Patients and
Counting, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/08/19/health-care-data-breaches-have-hit-
30m-patients-and-counting/.
42 Id.
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respondents reported that they had fallen victim to a data breach.43
While retailers seem to have gained the most publicity from these
breaches, companies from JP Morgan to Apple have suffered
breaches in which massive amounts of customer data was lost.44
Colleges and universities have fallen victim to an equally
concerning raft of data breaches in recent years.45 In 2014 alone,
twenty-eight separate breaches occurred in the education sector,
resulting in the dissemination of more than one million records.46
Breaches into educational institutions are often particularly
43 PONEMON INST., IS YOUR COMPANY READY FOR A BIG DATA BREACH?:
THE SECOND ANNUAL STUDY ON DATA BREACH PREPAREDNESS 1 (Sept. 2014),
http://www.experian.com/assets/data-breach/brochures/2014-ponemon-2nd-ann
ual-preparedness.pdf.
44 “Verizon’s annual Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) from May
of 2013 found that 24 percent of the confirmed data breaches in 2012 affected
the retail and restaurant sector.” Tony Bradley, Retailer Data Breach Trend Not
Likely to End Soon, PC WORLD: NET WORK (Jan. 27, 2014),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2090839/retailer-data-breach-trend-not-likely-
to-end-soon.html. In October 2014, the accounts of 76 million individual
customers and 8 million small businesses at JP Morgan were hacked. Jake
Swearingen, Why the JP Morgan Data Breach Is Like No Other, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/10/why-the-
jp-morgan-data-breach-is-like-no-other/381098/. In September 2014, Apple
suffered a very well publicized data breach in which more than 100 users’
iCloud accounts were hacked, leading to the release of nude photographs,
including those of actress Jennifer Lawrence. James Cook, Inside the iCloud
Hacking Ring That Leaked Those Naked Celebrity Photos, FIN. POST: BUS.
INSIDER (Sept. 2, 2014), http://business.financialpost.com/business-insider
/inside-the-icloud-hacking-ring-that-leaked-those-naked-celebrity-photos?__lsa
=d3b4-b120. Only weeks after the incident, hackers infiltrated 350,000 Chinese
iCloud accounts and accessed sensitive data such as account IDs and address
book data. Robert Mann, Just Weeks After Apple’s Celebrity Photo Scandal, the
Company Has to Deal With a Whole New Security Issue: This Time, It’s in
China, ADWEEK (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-
branding/just-weeks-after-apples-celebrity-photo-scandal-company-has-deal-wh
ole-new-security-issue-161261.
45 In fact, the author of this Note was a victim of a 2014 data breach at the
University of Maryland in which the “name[s], Social Security number[s],
date[s] of birth, and University identification number[s]” of 287,580 . . . faculty,
staff, students and affiliated personnel” were released. UMD Data Breach, U.
MD., http://www.umd.edu/datasecurity/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2015).
46 Chronology of Data Breaches, supra note 39.
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harmful because of the nature of the information that these
institutions maintain.47 Colleges and universities often collect and
store especially valuable information such as financial records,
bank information, and even students’ and faculty’s Social Security
numbers.48
B. The Causes of the Rise
One reason for the precipitous increase in the number and
severity of data breaches is the continuous migration of
information to electronic format. Consumers now overwhelmingly
rely on credit cards to purchase goods, both in stores and online.49
Additionally, businesses are increasingly replacing their file
cabinets with electronic cloud based storage from services like
Microsoft, Google, and newer companies like Box.50 Universities
have been making a similar transition to electronic storage for
years and now store almost all student records in electronic
databases accessible to administrators (and hackers) via the
Internet.51
Consumers are also moving their personal data into an
electronic format where it is vulnerable to unauthorized access. A
47 See Kyle McCarthy, 5 Colleges with Data Breaches Larger Than Sony’s
in 2014, HUFF POST COLLEGE (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.huffington
post.com/kyle-mccarthy/five-colleges-with-data-b_b_6474800.html.
48 In all five of the largest college or university breaches in 2014, partial or
whole social security numbers, and in some cases corresponding names and
bank information, were disseminated. Id.
49 A report issued by Javelin Strategy and Research determined that in
2012, credit or debit cards purchases comprised 66% of all “in person”
payments. Catherine New, Cash Dying as Credit Card Payments Predicted to
Grow in Volume: Report, HUFF POST MONEY (June 7, 2012), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/07/credit-card-payments-growth_n_1575417.html.
Moreover, in 2012, nearly 6% of all commercial transactions were conducted
online. Id.
50 Quentin Hardy, Google, Microsoft and Others Delve Deeper into Cloud
Storage for Businesses, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com
/2014/06/26/technology/google-microsoft-and-others-delve-deeper-into-cloud-st
orage-for-businesses.html.
51 Jason Koebler, Who Should Have Access to Student Records?, U.S.
NEWS (Jan. 19, 2012, 12:20 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012
/01/19/who-should-have-access-to-student-records.
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2013 study by the Pew Research Center found that 51% of all
adults in the United States now use online banking services that
allow access to, and often storage of, important bank account
information on home computers.52 Thirty-two percent of U.S. bank
account holders also use mobile banking services,53 which makes
information potentially even more vulnerable as it could be
accessed on mobile phones. The migration to electronic storage has
increased the quantity of information open to a breach and has left
more consumers reliant on organizations to adequately protect their
data.
Unfortunately, as discovered in the aftermath of Sony’s 2014
breach, many organizations entrusted with storing consumer data
are failing. Several companies that have suffered data breaches
have been accused of failing to take adequate steps to protect the
data they are charged with keeping safe.54 A recent report found
that of the 254 breaches in the first quarter of 2014 that resulted in
the loss of more than 200 million records, “only 1% were ‘secure
breaches’ or breaches where strong encryption, key management
and/or authentication solutions” and other best practices were
employed.55 For example, in the Sony breach, hackers exploited a
well-known and “basic” loophole to gain access to 101 million
customer and employee records.56
Many organizations also fail when responding to a breach once
it does happen. During a 2013 breach at Target, employees failed
to react to alerts from a cyber-security team and “stood by as 40
million credit card numbers—and 70 million addresses, phone
numbers, and other pieces of personal information—gushed out of
its mainframes.”57 Neiman Marcus similarly failed to act when it
52 Susannah Fox, 51% of U.S. Adults Bank Online, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 7,
2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/08/07/51-of-u-s-adults-bank-online/.
53 Id.
54 For example, one expert at a corporate security company stated that in
several recent breaches, the hackers “were using basic techniques that have been
understood for some [fifteen] years.”Weisbaum, supra note 18.
55 SAFENET, BREACH LEVEL INDEX: FIRST QUARTER RECAP 2014 (2014),
http://breachlevelindex.com/pdf/Breach-Level-Index-Report-Q12014.pdf.
56 SeeWeisbaum, supra note 18.
57 Michael Riley et al., Missed Alarms and 40 Million Stolen Credit Card
Numbers: How Target Blew It, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 13, 2014),
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ignored 59,746 warnings of “suspicious behavior” on its network.58
The company had also disabled its security system’s ability to
automatically block suspicious flagged activity in order to make
maintenance easier.59 These oversights led to the loss of 350,000
customers’ credit and debit card information.60 Ultimately,
consumers bear the brunt of the harm caused by this failure of
organizations to store their users’ information securely.
C. Legal Remedies for Data Breaches
Various legal strategies have been used in attempts to take
action against companies that fail to protect consumers’ data. The
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has taken action against, and
reached fifty civil settlements with, breached companies for
unreasonable data security practices, “principally through
enforcement of Section 5 of the FTC Act.”61 While these
settlements may have in some instances “halted harmful data
security practices [and] required companies to accord stronger
protections for consumer data,”62 they often serve a symbolic
function rather than a practical one. The FTC has reached
settlements with only a small fraction of the thousands of
companies that have been breached.63 The settlements also rarely
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-03-13/target-missed-alarms-in-
epic-hack-of-credit-card-data.
58 Ben Elgin et al., Neiman Marcus Hackers Set Off 60,000 Alerts While
Bagging Credit Card Data, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 21, 2014),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-02-21/neiman-marcus-hackers-set-
off-60-000-alerts-while-bagging-credit-card-data.
59 Id.
60 Venkat Balasubramani, Seventh Circuit: Data Breach Victims Have
Standing Based on Future Harm, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (July 24, 2015),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/07/seventh-circuit-data-breach-victim
s-have-standing-based-on-future-harm.htm.
61 FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMISSION STATEMENT MARKING THE FTC’S
50TH DATA SECURITY SETTLEMENT (2014) [hereinafter FTC Settlements],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140131gmrstatement.pdf.
62 Id.
63 Since 2005 there have been nearly 5,000 data breaches. Chronology of
Data Breaches, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org
/data-breach/new (last visited Sept. 25, 2015).
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impose any fines or damages and instead center on enforcing more
effective data security practices.64 In one such settlement, clothing
retailer TJ Maxx agreed to “implement a comprehensive security
program[,] . . . be audited by security professionals every other
year for 20 years[,] . . . [and] identify internal and external security
risks and assess the sufficiency of any safeguards in place to
control these risks.”65 In a similar settlement, the FTC required
health care billing company Accretive Health to implement a
comprehensive information security program and submit the
program for evaluation “every two years by a certified third
party.”66 Often, these settlements merely require companies to take
actions they should have already been taking; TJ Maxx, Accretive
Health, and other breached companies should have had the agreed-
to security protocols in place before their respective breaches.
Perhaps the biggest flaw in the FTC settlements, however, is that
consumers, the parties actually harmed by these data breaches,
may not receive any type of compensation for their lost
information.67
Because of this, many victims of data breaches have pursued
claims in federal court against the organizations that were
supposed to be securely storing their data.68 These victims have
64 See, e.g., Shannon Henson, FTC, TJX Settle Retail Data Breach Cases,
LAW360 (Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.law360.com/articles/51413/ftc-tjx-settle-
retail-data-breach-cases.
65 Id.
66 Accretive Health Settles FTC Charges That It Failed to Adequately
Protect Consumers’ Personal Information, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 31,
2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/12/accretive-health
-settles-ftc-charges-it-failed-adequately-protect.
67 For example, the Accretive Health settlement agreement did not “include
a monetary penalty.” Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, Accretive Health Breach:
FTC Settlement, DATA BREACH TODAY (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.
databreachtoday.com/accretive-health-breach-ftc-settlement-a-6332#.
68 See, e.g., Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 69–70 (1st Cir. 2012);
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir. 2011); Galaria v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 650 (S.D. Ohio 2014); In re Sci.
Applications Int’l Corp., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 19 (D.D.C. 2014); Strautins v.
Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 873 (N.D. Ill. 2014); In re Barnes
& Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-CV-8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 3, 2013). Often, these cases are brought as a single class action in one
jurisdiction. D. Christopher Robinson & Casey Wood Hensley, Cyber Security
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alleged a variety of different claims. Plaintiffs have alleged that the
information was a bailment and the “bailee”—the organization
charged with keeping it safe—was negligent in doing so under
property law concepts.69 Others have claimed that the companies
violated some state or federal regulation.70 The most common
claims, however, have been tort claims for failing to adequately
store personal information.71 Despite the apparent viability of these
claims, many federal courts have dismissed them, finding that the
plaintiffs did not have sufficient standing to bring a claim in
Breach Triggers Class Action Lawsuit Against eBay, FROST, BROWN, TODD
LLC: CLASS COUNSEL BLOG (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.classcounselblog.
com/cyber-security-eBay-class-action-identity-theft. Other times, suits are
brought as separate class actions in different jurisdictions that are subsequently
“centralized” by the Panel on Multi-District Litigation into a single claim heard
by a single district court. Overview of Panel, U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON
MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/panel-info/overview-panel
(last visited Sept. 25, 2015). The Panel “determine[s] whether civil actions
pending in different federal districts involve one or more common questions of
fact such that the actions should be transferred to one federal district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings; and . . . select[s] the judge or
judges and court assigned to conduct such proceedings.” Id. The actions are
consolidated to “avoid duplication of discovery, to prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings, and to conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the
judiciary.” Id. Counsel for the original classes usually act together as co-counsel
and if the claim proceeds to a final judgment or settlement, any damages
awarded are distributed amongst the class often from a central fund overseen by
the court. See Multi-District Litigation FAQ’s, CLASS ACTION LITIG. INFO.,
http://www.classactionlitigation.com/mdl/faq.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2015).
69 See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651
(S.D. Ohio 2014); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach
Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 955 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
70 Such plaintiffs often base their claims in legislation like the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.) which regulates the collection,
dissemination, and use of consumer information. See, e.g., Galaria, 998 F. Supp.
2d at 652. Plaintiffs can also pursue similar claims based on similar state
statutes. See, e.g., In re Sony Gaming Networks, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 965–66
(noting that plaintiffs pursued claims based on California’s consumer protection
statutes wherein companies were supposed to take reasonable measures to
protect consumer information).
71 See, e.g., Reilly, 664 F.3d at 40; Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d
1139, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2010); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629,
635 (7th Cir. 2007); Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 653; In re Sony Gaming
Networks, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 959–60.
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federal court under Article III of the Constitution.72 These courts
have found that the plaintiffs have not suffered a cognizable
Article III injury unless or until their stolen information is used in a
way that causes quantifiable financial harm.73 Although some
courts have been willing to find a sufficient injury even without
some quantifiable, demonstrable harm,74 the Supreme Court’s
decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA75 largely
changed the prevailing understanding of the injury requirement and
led to dismissal of many more data-breach claims.76
However, Clapper should not be read to require the dismissal
of these data breach claims. First, the Court in Clapper applied a
stricter standing test because of the national security and separation
of powers concerns present in the case.77 Second, and more
importantly, the injuries alleged in Clapper are distinguishable
from those that data breach plaintiffs allege. In Clapper, the Court
found that there was no injury because the plaintiffs could not
show that they were subject to surveillance.78 In all meritorious
data breach claims, however, the plaintiffs can all show that they
were subject to lost data. In Clapper, the Court did not require a
showing of harm resulting from any surveillance; it simply found
that the plaintiffs could not prove there was surveillance in the first
place.79 Data breach plaintiffs, by contrast, can all show that their
data was lost and should not be forced by a misapplication of
Clapper to demonstrate some type of harm beyond that initial loss.
72 See, e.g., Katz, 672 F.3d at 80–81; Reilly, 664 F3d at 46.
73 See, e.g., Katz, 672 F.3d at 79–80; Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42 (“We conclude
that Appellants’ allegations of hypothetical, future injury are insufficient to
establish standing.”); Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 656–57.
74 See, e.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 693–94 (7th
Cir. 2015).
75 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
76 See Heidi J. Milicic, Standing to Bring Data Breach Class Actions Post-
Clapper, AM. BAR ASS’N: COM. & BUS. LITIG. (Aug. 7, 2014),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/commercial/articles/summer2
014-0814-data-breach-class-actions-post-clapper.html.
77 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147.
78 Id. at 1152.
79 See id.
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Courts should recognize the true injuries of data breach claims and
the sufficiency of those injuries for standing.
II. STANDING ANDDATA BREACH CLAIMS
The doctrine of standing is derived from Article III of the
Constitution.80 The relevant clause states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their authority . . . to
Controversies between two or more States;--
between a State and Citizens of another State;--
between Citizens of different States;--between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different states, and between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.81
Article III extends to federal courts the authority to hear a case or
controversy between two adversarial parties.82 Notably, the clause
does not explicitly mention standing or any requirement of
injury.83 Since 1944, however, the Supreme Court has interpreted
Article III’s confinement of federal jurisdiction to “cases” or
“controversies” as a requirement that a party have “standing to
sue” in order to bring a claim in federal court.84 To satisfy the
modern standing test, a party must be able to prove a sufficient
injury.85
80 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
81 Id.
82 See id.
83 Id.
84 Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 303–04 (1944) (holding that a plaintiff
may only “secure judicial intervention” if he “possesses something more than a
general interest in the proper execution of the laws . . . ”); Bradford C. Mank,
Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing: Closer to Justice Breyer’s
Approach to Standing than to Justice Scalia’s, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 71, 77–78
(2012) [hereinafter Mank, Judge Posner’s Practical Theory].
85 Wickard, 321 U.S. at 305 (finding that the Plaintiff had “such a personal
claim as justifies judicial consideration”).
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Until the late twentieth century, standing simply meant that a
party bringing a federal claim needed to have a legitimate “genuine
interest and stake” in the claim.86 The standing requirement mainly
served to ensure that a plaintiff had a true cause of action in each
claim she brought.87 Modern standing doctrine also reflects other
constitutional ideals that the Supreme Court has sought to uphold
by narrowing the circumstances under which parties may bring a
claim.88 One underlying concern of the standing doctrine is the
issuance of advisory opinions.89 By limiting standing to parties that
have actually suffered a real injury, courts may only hear claims
resulting from true “cases” or “controversies” rather than issuing
decisions about speculative “what-ifs.”90 Standing doctrine also
preserves separation of powers.91 Many scholars and jurists believe
that limiting standing is essential to ensure that federal courts only
hear matters prescribed to them by the Constitution and
Congress.92 The Supreme Court has consistently enforced the
standing requirement as a way to “prevent the judicial process
from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.”93
Currently, the Supreme Court employs a three-part test to
determine whether a party has sufficient standing to bring a claim
86 Mank, Judge Posner’s Practical Theory, supra note 84, at 77–78.
87 See Cass Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168–171 (1992).
88 Mank, Judge Posner’s Practical Theory, supra note 84, at 78 (“Standing
requirements are related to broader constitutional principles.”).
89 Id. (“Standing doctrine prohibits unconstitutional advisory opinions.”).
Some scholars argue that the standing doctrine does not actually assist in
prohibiting advisory opinions, yet the Court and other scholars still often cite
this as a major rationale for the development of the standing doctrine. See, e.g.,
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 247 (1988).
90 Fletcher, supra note 89, at 222.
91 See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of
the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881 (1983) (arguing that
the standing doctrine is an essential element of separation of powers). For a
further discussion of Scalia’s argument see Mank, Judge Posner’s Practical
Theory, supra note 84, at 104–05.
92 Scalia, supra note 91, at 881 (“[J]udicial doctrine of standing is a crucial
and inseparable element [of separation of powers].”).
93 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013).
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under Article III.94 The plaintiff must first demonstrate that she has
“suffered an ‘injury in fact’ . . . which is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.’”95 The plaintiff must then show that “there [is] a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of.”96 To satisfy this requirement “the injury has to be
‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and
not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party
not before the court.’”97 Finally, the plaintiff must establish that “it
[is] ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will
be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”98 The plaintiff carries the
burden of satisfying all three prongs of this test.99
This test, and the Court in interpreting it, stresses that an injury
must be imminent, and that merely speculative or hypothetical
injuries will not suffice for purposes of standing.100 In Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, a case in which the Court clarified the
modern, pre-Clapper standing requirement, the Supreme Court
held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a claim challenging
U.S. government agencies’ failure to consult with the Secretary of
the Interior before defunding projects that could harm endangered
species in Egypt and Sri Lanka.101 The plaintiffs claimed that they
were injured because they intended on going back abroad to
observe the endangered animals.102 The Court dismissed this claim
finding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any required
94 For further explanation of the three-part test see Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
95 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155
(1990)).
96 Id. at 560.
97 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 42 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)).
98 Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 42 U.S. at 38, 43).
99 See id.
100 See id.; see also Bradford C. Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l: Two or
Three Competing Philosophies of Standing Law?, 81 TENN. L. REV. 211, 220
(2014) [hereinafter Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l].
101 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558–59, 563, 578.
102 Id. at 563.
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“actual or imminent” injury.103 The majority opinion cited one
plaintiff’s admission that she had “no current plans” to return and
concluded that mere “‘some day’ intentions—without any
description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of
when the some day will be—[can]not support a finding of the
‘actual or imminent injury’ that our cases require.”104
Prior to Clapper, federal district and circuit courts applied the
standing test derived from Lujan to data breach claims with
conflicting results. Some courts held that data breach plaintiffs
could not claim sufficient injuries to maintain standing unless they
could demonstrate that they were actually harmed by the data
breach (for example, subjected to identity theft or other fraud).105
These courts concluded that harms such as the increased risk of
identity theft or the increased risk of data misuse did not meet
Lujan’s “actual or imminent” injury requirement.106 For instance,
in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., the plaintiff, whose data was accessed
in the breach of a payroll services company, pursued a claim
against the company alleging injury in the form of an increased
risk of identity theft and costs of monitoring credit activity.107 The
Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ “allegations of hypothetical,
future injury [were] insufficient to establish standing,” mainly
because the allegations of harm were “dependent on entirely
speculative, future actions of an unknown third-party.”108 The
court reasoned that the plaintiff could not demonstrate sufficient
injury to maintain standing unless or until his information was
103 Id. at 564 (“[The Plaintiffs’ affidavits] plainly contain no facts,
however, showing how damage to the species will produce ‘imminent’
injury . . . .”).
104 Id.
105 See, e.g., Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 79–80 (1st Cir. 2012);
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46 (3d Cir. 2011).
106 See, e.g., Katz, 672 F.3d at 79–81 (rejecting several claims because
Plaintiff failed to meet “irreducible minimum requirements of pleading and
Article III” in light of the fact that plaintiff did not allege any actual exposure or
misuse of her personal information); Reilly, 664 F.3d at 46 (“[Plaintiffs’]
allegations of an increased risk of identity theft as a result of the security breach
are hypothetical, future injuries, and are therefore insufficient to establish
standing.”).
107 Reilly, 664 F.3d at 40.
108 Id. at 42.
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misused in a way that actually caused some sort of cognizable
injury.109
Other courts in pre-Clapper data breach cases reached the
opposite conclusion and held that the plaintiff could demonstrate a
sufficiently imminent injury to maintain standing.110 These courts
recognized that the increased risk of future harm that could occur
as a result of the breach was a sufficiently imminent injury.111 In
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., for example, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and
immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing
their unencrypted personal data.”112 While the conflict over what
burden data breach plaintiffs must meet to establish standing still
exists, the Supreme Court’s decision in Clapper v. Amnesty
International, issued shortly after the decisions like those in Reilly
and Krottner, has seemed to change the common understanding of
standing in data breach cases and has been particularly persuasive
to courts hearing such cases.
109 Id. (“[Plaintiffs’] contentions rely on speculation that the hacker: (1)
read, copied, and understood their personal information; (2) intends to commit
future criminal acts by misusing the information; and (3) is able to use such
information to the detriment of [Plaintiffs] by making unauthorized transactions
in [Plaintiffs’] names. Unless and until these conjectures come true, [Plaintiffs]
have not suffered any injury; there has been no misuse of the information, and
thus, no harm.”).
110 See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632–34 (7th Cir.
2007) (finding sufficient standing for plaintiffs bringing a data breach claim
against a bank even though the plaintiffs did not incur any financial loss or
suffer identity theft); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140–43 (9th
Cir. 2010) (finding standing when Starbucks employees’ PII was accessed from
a stolen employee laptop).
111 See, e.g., Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143 (holding that “Plaintiffs–
Appellants have alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm”);
Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634 (holding that the “injury-in-fact requirement can be
satisfied by a threat of future harm or by an act . . . increasing the risk of future
harm that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced . . . ”).
112 Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143. The court ultimately dismissed the claims,
concluding that while the increased risk of identity theft was enough to maintain
Article III standing, it was not enough to sufficiently plead the claims of
negligence and breach of implied contract under Washington state law. See id. at
1140.
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III. CLAPPER V. AMNESTY INT’LUSA: ANAPPARENT “TIGHTENING”
OF THE STANDING TEST
While the Supreme Court has not definitively stated whether
and under what circumstances data breach plaintiffs can meet their
standing burden, in Clapper v. Amnesty International the Court
seemed to offer some guidance.113 In that case, Amnesty
International’s U.S. branch (“Amnesty”) brought a claim against
the federal government challenging the constitutionality of a
National Security Agency (“NSA”) surveillance program.114 The
Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the claims, but instead
solely addressed whether Amnesty had Article III standing to bring
its claims.115
Amnesty claimed that it frequently communicated with foreign
organizations and individuals in other countries whom it believed
were targets of NSA surveillance.116 It asserted it had sufficient
Article III standing because of the “objectively reasonable
likelihood” that these communications with foreign entities would
be acquired by the NSA.117 Amnesty argued that this compromised
its ability to “locate witnesses, cultivate sources, obtain
information, and communicate confidential information to [its]
clients.”118 Alternatively, Amnesty alleged that even if this
potentially threatened injury was not sufficiently imminent for
standing purposes, it also suffered the present injury of being
113 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (ruling
that that the Second Circuit’s “objectively reasonable likelihood” standard does
not satisfy the requirement that a “threatened injury must be certainly impending
to constitute injury in fact”).
114 Id. at 1142. The plaintiff-respondents sought declaratory and injunctive
relief, claiming that Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(“FISA”), which permitted government surveillance of individuals who were
reasonably believed to be outside of the United States and who were not “United
States persons” was unconstitutional. Id. The term “United States person”
denotes a U.S. citizen, a permanent resident alien, or a U.S. corporation. 50
U.S.C. § 1801(i) (2015).
115 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1155.
116 Id. at 1142.
117 Id. at 1143.
118 Id. at 1145.
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forced to “take costly and burdensome measures to protect the
confidentiality of [its] international communications.”119
The Court held that Amnesty did not have standing under
either theory.120 The majority opinion, written by Justice Alito,
concluded that Amnesty’s “theory of future injury [was] too
speculative to satisfy the well-established requirement that
threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending.’”121 The majority
explained that the threatened injury rested on Amnesty’s “highly
speculative fear” of a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities.”122
The Court viewed this fear as even more speculative because
several of the links in the chain relied on the decisions of
independent actors including the NSA, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, and Amnesty’s foreign contacts.123 Ultimately,
Amnesty could only speculate that the government would use
surveillance in a way that would affect it, and this speculation was
not enough to maintain standing.124
The Court found Amnesty’s alternative theory of present injury
similarly insufficient.125 Amnesty claimed that it suffered ongoing
injuries due to precautions it took to avoid having its
communications intercepted, such as communicating “in
generalities rather than specifics” and traveling to have in-person
conversations rather than speaking over phone or email.126 The
119 Id. at 1143.
120 Id. at 1155.
121 Id. at 1143.
122 Id. at 1148 (“[R]espondents’ argument rests on their highly speculative
fear that: (1) the Government will decide to target the communications of non-
U.S. persons with whom they communicate; (2) in doing so, the Government
will choose to invoke its authority under §1881a rather than utilizing another
method of surveillance; (3) the Article III judges who serve on the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court will conclude that the Government’s proposed
surveillance procedures satisfy § 1881a’s many safeguards and are consistent
with the Fourth Amendment; (4) the Government will succeed in intercepting
the communications of respondents’ contacts; and (5) respondents will be parties
to the particular communications that the Government intercepts.”).
123 Id. at 1148–50.
124 Id. (“[R]espondents’ speculative chain of possibilities does not establish
that injury based on potential future surveillance is certainly impending . . . .”).
125 Id. at 1150.
126 Id. at 1150–51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Court rejected this claim as nothing more than a “repackaged
version” of Amnesty’s first attempt to gain standing.127 It viewed
the costs that Amnesty “incurred to avoid surveillance [as] simply
the product of their fear of surveillance.”128 The majority was
skeptical of Amnesty “manufactur[ing] standing merely by
inflicting harm on [itself] based on [its] fears of hypothetical future
harm that is not certainly impending.” The Court further stated that
granting standing for this injury would allow the plaintiffs, “for the
price of a plane ticket [to] transform their standing burden from
one requiring a showing of actual or imminent . . . interception to
one requiring a showing that their subjective fear of such
interception is not fanciful, irrational, or clearly unreasonable.”129
Ultimately, the Court found all the injuries Amnesty claimed too
speculative to meet its standing burden.130
Many scholars and lower courts have viewed the Court’s
decision in Clapper as a “tightening” of the imminence test
required to demonstrate Article III standing.131 For many, the
decision requires that a plaintiff now demonstrate not only that it
would be objectively reasonable for an injury to occur, but also
that the injury be certainly impending.132 The decision was seen as
an especially “pivotal point in the evolving law of data breach”
standing.133 Many observers viewed Clapper as making it nearly
impossible for data breach plaintiffs to maintain standing if the
only injury they can point to is the mere loss of their data.134
127 Id. at 1151.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1155.
131 See, e.g., Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 100, at 222.
132 Id.
133 Judy Selby & Corey Dennis, No Data Misuse? No Standing for Data
Breach Plaintiffs, LAW360 (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles
/529877/no-data-misuse-no-standing-for-data-breach-plaintiffs.
134 See, e.g., Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 100, at 221–22;
Milicic, supra note 76; David R. Singh et al., Data Breach Class Action
Defendants Look to NSA Case, LAW360 (July 15, 2014), http://www.law360
.com/articles/556770/data-breach-class-action-defendants-look-to-nsa-case;
Selby & Dennis, supra note 133. Admittedly, some of this post-Clapper
assessment may be attributable to the Defense bar eager for a new tool to protect
data breach clients from costly class action litigation.
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Academics and practitioners experienced in data breach cases
argued that Clapper bars data breach plaintiffs unless they can
demonstrate a concrete and cognizable harm that has occurred
from the loss of data, such as identity theft or financial loss.135A
number of courts have subscribed to this thinking and have
dismissed data breach claims for lack of standing under Clapper.136
The plaintiffs could not show any presently occurring harm and the
courts dismissed the claims because the injuries the plaintiffs
asserted were too speculative to satisfy Clapper’s “certainly
impending”137 test for future injuries.138
In one of the first cases to apply the supposedly stricter
Clapper test to a data breach plaintiff, In re Barnes & Noble Pin
Pad Litigation, the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing.139 The
plaintiffs alleged various types of harms resulting from Barnes &
Noble’s alleged failure to safeguard customers’ personal
information and the resulting breach including:
untimely and inadequate notification of the security
breach, improper disclosure of their personal
identifying information or ‘PII’, loss of privacy,
expenses incurred in efforts to mitigate the
increased risk of identity theft or fraud, time lost
mitigating the increased risk of identity theft or
135 See, e.g., Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 100, at 221–22;
Milicic, supra note 76; Singh, supra note 134; Selby & Dennis, supra note 133.
136 See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 650
(S.D. Ohio 2014); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 31
(D.D.C. 2014); Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 879,
882 (N.D. Ill. 2014); In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., 12-CV-8617, 2013
WL 4759588, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013).
137 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct 1138, 1143 (2013).
138 Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 655; In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 45
F. Supp. 3d at 25; Strautins, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 875, 882; In re Barnes & Noble
Pin Pad Litig., 2013 WL 4759588, at *5.
139 In re Barnes & Noble, 2013 WL 4759588, at *5. The class action
plaintiffs were customers of Barnes & Noble during the time when the company
lost customers’ credit card information to “skimming”; software was installed on
the company’s computers that automatically downloaded the number and
cardholder information of credit cards swiped at Barnes & Noble registers. Id. at
*1.
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fraud, an increased risk of identity theft, deprivation
of the value of Plaintiffs’ PII, and anxiety and
emotional distress.140
The court found none of these injuries sufficient to meet the
standing burden.141 Applying Clapper, the court held that the
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that any of the injuries were
certainly impending.142 The court concluded that the plaintiffs, like
those in Clapper, incurred expenses to mitigate the alleged
increased risk of identity theft out of unfounded fear.143 Thus, the
court considered all of the plaintiffs’ claimed injuries too
speculative to meet its interpretation of the Clapper standard.144
Several other courts have used the same test and analysis to
produce similar holdings in the wake of the Clapper decision.145
Contrary to the conclusions in these cases, the injuries alleged in
data breach cases should be sufficient to maintain standing, even
when analyzed using Clapper.
IV. DISTINGUISHING CLAPPER’S INJURIES
For several reasons, Clapper actually does support standing for
data breach plaintiffs when the alleged injury is loss of their data.
First, Clapper is, by the Court’s own admission, an “especially
rigorous” application of the Court’s standing test due to the Court’s
concerns about the case’s implications on separation of powers,
foreign affairs, and national security.146 Data breach claims, by
140 Id. at *2.
141 Id. at *3–6.
142 Id.
143 Id. at *4.
144 Id. at *5.
145 See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 655 (S.D.
Ohio 2014) (“Plaintiffs failed to allege facts demonstrating the increased risk
makes any future injury ‘certainly impending’ as opposed to speculative.”); In re
Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 28 (D.D.C. 2014) (“In sum,
increased risk of harm alone does not constitute an injury in fact. Nor do
measures taken to prevent a future, speculative harm.”); Strautins v. Trustwave
Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“Clapper compels
rejection of [the] claim that an increased risk of identity theft is sufficient to
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing.”).
146 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013).
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contrast, generally involve two civilian parties and the claims do
not focus on issues of national security or foreign policy.147
Instead, plaintiffs almost always bring fairly straightforward civil
claims.148 Second, the Court in Clapper did not employ a stricter or
even different standard than that used in previous standing
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court used the same standing test and
found that the plaintiffs in Clapper, and the injuries they claimed,
could not pass that test.149 In the data breach context, however,
plaintiffs suffer sufficient injuries to afford them standing under
the traditional standing test.
Many courts relying on Clapper to deny data breach plaintiffs’
standing analogize the alleged injuries in Clapper to data breach
harms150 and determine that data breach injuries are likewise too
speculative.151 This interpretation of Clapper overlooks an
important distinction. The Clapper Court did not conclude that
being subjected to government surveillance was too speculative a
type of injury to maintain standing; instead, the Court held that the
plaintiffs’ claim that the injury had actually or would actually
happen—that they were subjected or were likely to be subjected to
that surveillance—was too speculative.152 In the data breach
context, however, the plaintiffs can easily prove that they have
been subjected to a data breach and the loss of personal
information.153 This reading and application of Clapper, coupled
147 See, e.g., Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 69–70 (1st Cir. 2012)
(involving a dispute between an accountholder and broker); Reilly v. Ceridian
Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir. 2011) (involving a dispute between law firm
employees and payroll processing firm); Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 650
(involving a dispute between consumers and insurer); Strautins, 27 F. Supp. 3d
at 873 (involving a dispute between consumers and data security company).
148 See, e.g., Katz, 672 F.3d at 70; Reilly, 664 F.3d at 40; Galaria, 998 F.
Supp. 2d at 649; Strautins, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 873 (all involving claims of
negligence).
149 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1153.
150 See, e.g., Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 654 (“Plaintiffs’ contention that an
increased risk of harm constitutes injury-in fact is similar to the respondent’s
position in [Clapper].”).
151 Id. at 654–55.
152 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150.
153 See, e.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir.
2015) (“[I]t is important not to overread Clapper. Clapper was addressing
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with the recognition that the Clapper Court was applying the
traditional standing test in a uniquely rigorous way, makes it clear
that data breach plaintiffs should have standing under Clapper.
A. The “Especially Rigorous” Application in Clapper
The majority opinion in Clapper indicates that the holding may
not be applicable to other contexts like data breaches and instead
might be limited to the facts and circumstances of that case.154 The
Court stated that its “standing inquiry ha[d] been especially
rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force [it] to
decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of
the Federal Government was unconstitutional.”155 The majority
recited previous decisions where the court refrained from finding
standing when it might expand judicial power at the cost of
legislative or executive power, or otherwise intrude on a policy
decision made by Congress or the Executive.156 The Court further
stated that this is especially true in the context of foreign relations
and national security.157 The majority pointed out that the Court
speculative harm based on something that may not even have happened to some
or all of the plaintiffs. In our case, Neiman Marcus does not contest the fact that
the initial breach took place.”).
154 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147. See also Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l,
supra note 100, at 225–26 (“The Clapper decision sent mixed signals about
whether its approach to standing was generally applicable to all cases or whether
it was more limited to standing in intelligence-gathering and foreign affairs
cases.”).
155 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,
819–20 (1997)).
156 Id. (first citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997); then citing
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
454 U.S. 464, 473–74 (1982) (finding that standing would violate Constitutional
constraints on the power of the judiciary); and then citing Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974) (“[H]ere the relief
sought would, in practical effect, bring about conflict with two coordinate
branches.”)).
157 Id. (first citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170 (1974)
(denying standing to a plaintiff challenging the constitutionality of a statute
allowing the director of the CIA to be the sole certifying auditor of agency
expenditures); then citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208, 222 (1974) (ruling that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge
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had “often found a lack of standing [when] the Judiciary has been
requested to review actions of the political branches in the fields of
intelligence gathering and foreign affairs.”158 The opinion then
listed extensive precedent in which the Court had refused to grant
standing to parties seeking to challenge the constitutionality of
policies and programs created by the military or the intelligence
community, such as the Central Intelligence Agency or NSA.159
Data breach claims should not be subject to this level of rigor.
The vast majority of data breaches affect business and commercial
entities like retail stores, banks, and other financial service
providers, or institutions such as hospitals and universities.160
Government entities, especially those involved in national security
or foreign affairs, are rarely involved in breaches that expose
consumer data.161 Moreover, claims against data breach defendants
typically sound in tort, contract, or property and do not contain the
constitutional separation of powers implications that motivated the
stricter standing inquiry in Clapper.162 Therefore, data breach
Congress member’s enlistment in Armed Forces Reserve); and then citing Laird
v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11–16 (1972) (finding no standing for plaintiffs
challenging Army intelligence program)).
158 Id.
159 Id. at 1148.
160 In 2013, breaches of “Business,” “Educational,” “Financial/Credit,” and
the “Health/Medical” Industries composed approximately 90.9% of all data
breaches. ITRC 2013 Breach List Tops 600 in 2013, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE
CTR., http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ITRC-Surveys-Studies/2013-data-breaches.
html (last updated Feb. 5, 2015).
161 Some institutions commonly affected by breaches, such as hospitals and
universities, are considered government entities for some purposes. However,
they are rarely involved in matters of intelligence or national security and there
is no reason to think that a plaintiff pursuing an action for data breach against
this type of entity would be denied standing because of separation of powers
concerns. See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646,
649 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (plaintiffs pursued claims under tort and property theories
against a private entity); In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d
1197, 1211 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (plaintiffs pursued claim for declaratory relief
against a private company).
162 See, e.g., Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 649 (plaintiffs alleged tort claims
of increased risk of identity theft, loss of privacy, deprivation of value of PII,
and a negligent bailment property claim.); In re Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1211
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claims do not deserve the “especially rigorous” application of the
standing test found in Clapper.163
B. The Injuries Sustained by Data Breach Plaintiffs are
Different Than Those in Clapper and Are Sufficiently
“Imminent”
Data breach plaintiffs most commonly attempt to demonstrate
standing by showing an increased risk of future harm due to the
loss of data and the cost to monitor and/or mitigate this risk.164 For
example, the plaintiffs in Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company claimed that they:
incurred . . . damages in the form of . . . the
imminent, immediate, and continuing increased risk
of identity theft, identity fraud . . . out-of-pocket
expenses to purchase credit monitoring, internet
monitoring, identity theft insurance and/or other
data breach risk mitigation products . . . expenses
incurred to mitigate the increased risk of identity
theft, identify fraud and/or medical fraud . . . [and]
the value of the time spent mitigating the increased
risk of identity theft, identity fraud and/or medical
fraud.165
The District Court in Galaria relied on Clapper’s analysis and
“certainly impending” standard to deny standing to the plaintiffs
for both the increased harm injuries and the mitigation injuries.166
The court analogized these injuries to the injuries in Clapper and
(plaintiffs alleged inter alia that Adobe breached its contract by providing
inadequate security measures).
163 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147.
164 See, e.g., Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 651 (noting that the plaintiffs
alleged harm from “increased risk of harm/cost to mitigate increased risk.”); In
re Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1211 (“Plaintiffs allege that they have all suffered at
least one of three types of cognizable injuries-in-fact: (1) increased risk of future
harm; (2) cost to mitigate the risk of future harm; and/or (3) loss of the value of
their Adobe products.”).
165 Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 651. The Plaintiffs also alleged harm in the
form of “loss of privacy and . . . deprivation of the value of [their] PII.” Id.
166 Id. at 657–58.
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held that “neither the increased risk nor the expenses to mitigate
that risk constitute an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer
standing.”167 Citing Clapper throughout its opinion, the Galaria
court concluded that “the increased risk that Plaintiffs will be
victims of identity theft, identity fraud, medical fraud, or phishing
at some indeterminate point in the future” was too speculative to
support standing.168 The majority concluded that just as in
Clapper, the plaintiffs could not “manufacture standing”169 simply
“by choosing to make expenditures in order to mitigate a purely
speculative harm.”170 The court found that the plaintiffs’ claims of
increased risk of identity theft were comparably speculative to
Amnesty International’s claims that it had an increased risk of its
communications being intercepted by the government.171
Other courts followed the same reasoning as the Galaria court,
applying Clapper’s “certainly impending” requirement and finding
that the data breach plaintiffs’ “theor[ies] of future injury” were
too speculative to maintain standing.172 In Strautins v. Trustwave
Holdings, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
compared the alleged injury—increased risk of future identity
theft—to the injuries in Clapper and concluded that the injuries
were based on a “chain of attenuated hypothetical events and
actions by third parties independent of the defendant.”173 However,
the courts deciding Galaria and Strautins, and others that reach the
same conclusions, mistakenly conflate two very distinguishable
sets of injuries.
An overly strict reliance on Clapper has caused these courts to
overlook that the injury in data breach cases is the loss of the data
itself. Although concrete financial or other injury may not
immediately follow a data breach, courts need not look for this
type of harm when applying the standing test, even as articulated in
167 Id. at 658.
168 Id. at 657.
169 Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143, 1151
(2013)).
170 Id. at 658.
171 Id. at 654–55.
172 Id.
173 Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 876 (N.D. Ill.
2014).
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Clapper. The true injury the Court looked for in Clapper was the
“interception” of the plaintiffs’ communications. The Court did not
search for any harm resulting from the interception; the
interception itself would have been enough if the plaintiffs had
been able to demonstrate it had actually occurred.174 In the data
breach context, the “interception” of the plaintiffs’ data is the
similarly sufficient injury. Because this type of loss necessarily
occurs for plaintiffs who can show they are victims of a data
breach, courts should recognize standing for data breach plaintiffs
even if applying Clapper.
A later case addressing Article III standing, Susan B. Anthony
List v. Dreihaus supports this proposition.175 In Dreihaus, the
Supreme Court considered the standing of plaintiffs pursuing a
pre-enforcement challenge to an Ohio statute prohibiting the use of
certain statements during political campaigns.176 The Court held
that the plaintiffs did have standing to challenge the statute even
before it was enforced in a way that caused any harm or injury to
the plaintiff.177 The majority reasoned that the plaintiffs should not
need to subject themselves to “an actual arrest, prosecution, or
other enforcement” as “a prerequisite to challenge the law.”178 Part
of the analysis hinged on the fact that the plaintiffs provided
evidence to demonstrate that they would be subjected to the law.179
The Court used Clapper’s “certainly impending” imminence
test and also took guidance from extensive precedent affording
parties standing to challenge allegedly unconstitutional statutes
before their enforcement.180 These “pre-enforcement”181 cases
174 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1151–52 (2013). The
Court noted that the Second Circuit held that Amnesty had standing “due to the
objectively reasonable likelihood that their communications will be intercepted
at some time in the future.” Id. at 1146.
175 Susan B. Anthony List v. Dreihaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014).
176 Id. at 2338.
177 Id. at 2347.
178 Id. at 2342.
179 Id. at 2343. The Plaintiff alleged in its complaint an “inten[t] to engage
in substantially similar activity in the future,” contending that these future
actions “will remain arguably proscribed by Ohio’s false statement statute,” and
therefore the “threat of future enforcement of the false statement statute is
substantial.” Id. at 2343–45 (alteration in original).
180 Id. at 2341–42.
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instruct that “a plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement
where he alleges ‘an intention to engage in a course of
conduct . . . and there exists a credible threat of prosecution
thereunder.’”182 The Court recognized that the true injury in pre-
enforcement cases was the mere passing and existence of a
potentially unconstitutional law and not the resulting
punishment.183
The Supreme Court has long recognized “pre-enforcement”
standing, like that in Dreihaus, and has allowed plaintiffs to
challenge potentially unconstitutional statutes before the statutes
are actually enforced.184 Such plaintiffs may suffer distress from
the fear of eventually being arrested, prosecuted, fined, or
otherwise punished while simply waiting for a statute to be
enforced.185 The Court has acknowledged that unconstitutional
statutes might also have a “chilling effect” that has the same
ultimate effect as the statute being enforced; people refrain from
the prohibited behavior out of fear of eventual enforcement.186 The
Court has also recognized that it should not force individuals to
subject themselves to punishment in order to challenge a
potentially unconstitutional statute.187
181 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (“[I]t is not necessary
that petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to
challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional
rights.”); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128–29 (2007)
(“[W]e do not require a plaintiff to expose himself to liability before bringing
suit to challenge the basis for the threat.”); Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Assn.,
484 U.S. 383 (1988); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
182 Dreihaus, 134 S.Ct. at 2342 (quoting Babbit v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S.
289, 298 (1979)).
183 See id. at 2347.
184 See id. at 2342 (“When an individual is subject to such a threat, an
actual arrest, prosecution, or other enforcement action is not a prerequisite to
challenging the law.”); see also Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459; MedImmune Inc., 549
U.S. at 128–29; Babbit v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289 (1979); Am. Booksellers
Assn., 484 U.S. at 383; Holder, 561 U.S. at 1.
185 See Dreihaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2342.
186 See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) (citing to several cases
where the Supreme Court has found that government action has a “chilling
effect” on behaviors and speech even though it does not directly prohibit that
behavior or speech).
187 See Dreihaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2342.
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This same reasoning applies in data breach cases and should
allow data breach plaintiffs standing at the moment their data is
lost in a breach. The fear of identity theft and the distress caused
by anticipating the unauthorized use of one’s PII are cognizable
injuries, especially because plaintiffs cannot retrieve the exposed
information which can now be used by any person anywhere in the
world.188 Furthermore, in the data breach context, victims have no
control over how a third party will use their data. Courts should not
force these victims to wait until their data is misused to permit
them to seek to remedy their injuries in court.
Some lower courts hearing recent data breach claims have
begun to recognize this and have applied Clapper to data breach
cases to find sufficient basis for standing. 189 In a less publicized
2011 breach of Sony, the company’s PlayStation network suffered
a “massive breach . . . that led to the theft of names, addresses, and
possibly credit card data belonging to 77 million user accounts.”190
The District Court for the Southern District of California
concluded that the plaintiffs did have standing even under
Clapper.191 The court rejected Sony’s argument that Clapper
“tightened the ‘injury-in-fact’ analysis . . . previously relied upon
by” courts addressing Article III standing.192 The court recognized
that, although Clapper used different language than earlier
188 See Bob Unruh, U.S. ‘Forever Threatened by OPM Data Breach,’
WND (June 29, 2015), http://www.wnd.com/2015/06/u-s-forever-threatened-by-
opm-data-breach/.
189 See, e.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 693–94 (7th
Cir. 2015); In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214
(N.D. Cal. 2014); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach
Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 961–62 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
190 Liana B. Baker & Jim Finkle, Sony PlayStation Suffers Massive Data
Breach, REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/26/
us-sony-stoldendata-idUSTRE73P6WB20110426.
191 In re Sony Gaming Networks, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 960. The court had
already denied Sony’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing but agreed to
reconsider the motion after the Clapper opinion was issued, recognizing that
“Article III standing is an ‘indispensable part of a plaintiff’s case.’” Id. at 960
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildfire, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). Notably,
the court upheld its ruling that the Plaintiff’s had sufficient standing, even when
applying Clapper to the claim. Id. at 962–63.
192 Id. at 961.
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cases,193 it “did not set forth a new Article III framework . . . [or]
overrule previous precedent.”194 Instead, the court noted, “the
Supreme Court’s decision in Clapper simply reiterated an already
well-established framework for assessing whether a plaintiff had
sufficiently alleged an ‘injury-in-fact’ for purposes of establishing
Article III standing.”195 The court rejected the stricter application
of Clapper and recognized that Clapper merely restated the
traditional standing test, which affords data breach plaintiffs
standing.196
The In re Sony court also disagreed with Sony’s second
argument that the plaintiffs did not have sufficient standing
because “their Personal Information was [never] actually accessed
by a third party.”197 The court acknowledged that neither Clapper,
nor any earlier standing cases, required these types of
allegations.198 The plaintiffs only needed to allege a “‘credible
threat’ of impending harm based on the disclosure of their personal
information following the intrusion.”199 In other words, data breach
plaintiffs do not need to demonstrate that their information was
actually used in a way that caused some sort of quantifiable
monetary harm. Instead, the loss of the information itself is enough
to warrant standing.
A similar 2014 decision lends additional support. In In re
Adobe Systems Inc. Privacy Litigation, the District Court for the
Northern District of California denied Adobe Systems’ motion to
dismiss a class action data breach claim for lack of Article III
standing.200 Adobe argued, like Sony, that Clapper established a
stricter standing test that the plaintiffs in this case could not
193 For example, in Krottner, a pre-Clapper data breach standing case, the
court required a showing of a “credible threat of harm” that is “real and
immediate.” Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010).
194 In re Sony Gaming Networks, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 961.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 962.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d. 1197, 1232 (N.D.
Cal. 2014).
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pass.201 The court disagreed, however, noting that “Clapper did not
change the law governing Article III standing,” and “did not
overrule any precedent [or] reformulate the familiar standing
requirements of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.”202
Further, the court recognized that “Clapper’s discussion of
standing arose in the sensitive context of a claim that other
branches of government were violating the Constitution, and the
U.S. Supreme Court itself noted that its standing analysis was
unusually rigorous as a result.”203
The In re Adobe court held that the injuries the plaintiffs were
claiming were “sufficiently concrete and imminent to satisfy
Clapper.”204 The court based this conclusion primarily on the
understanding that the true damage that should be analyzed in data
breach claims is the loss of the information itself.205 The court
recognized that “in contrast to Clapper, where there was no
evidence that any of respondents’ communications either had been
or would be monitored . . ., here there [was] no need to speculate
as to whether Plaintiffs’ information has been stolen and what
information was taken.”206 The In re Adobe court properly
recognized that the injuries alleged in Clapper were too
speculative only because there was no evidence that the plaintiffs’
communications actually were or would be intercepted.207 In data
breach cases, however, the plaintiffs are in court only because their
information has already been intercepted.208
201 Id. at 1212.
202 Id. at 1213.
203 Id. at 1214 (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147
(2013)).
204 Id.
205 Id. at 1214–15. (“[T]he threatened harm alleged here is sufficiently
concrete and imminent to satisfy Clapper.” There is no “need to speculate as to
whether the hackers intend to misuse the personal information stolen in the 2013
data breach or whether they will be able to do so.”).
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 See id. at 1215–16.
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The In re Sony Networks and In re Adobe decisions209 represent
an important shift in data breach litigation. Not only did the courts
recognize that the plaintiffs met their standing burden but they also
explicitly stated that Clapper does not bar data breach claims and
instead permits them even when the only harm a plaintiff can show
is that their information was wrongfully accessed in a breach.210
Courts should stop interpreting Clapper as a requirement that the
plaintiffs demonstrate injury resulting from some use of lost
information and instead should read Clapper to recognize that the
true injury in a data breach claim is the loss of the information
alone.
CONCLUSION
As data breaches become more common and more severe,
more consumers are turning to the courts to remedy their injuries
and are often being denied standing because of many courts’
misapplication of Clapper.211 These courts are mistakenly
comparing the claimed injury in Clapper—government
surveillance—to what they view as the injury in data breach
cases—some harm stemming from the data breach.212 The true
injury in data breach cases, however, is the loss of the claimant’s
209 It should be noted that both of these cases were decided in the Ninth
Circuit (in the Southern and Northern Districts of California, respectively) and
the courts deciding these cases relied heavily on the Ninth Circuit decision in
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010), which granted
standing for data breach plaintiffs. See In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66
F. Supp. 3d. at 1211–12; In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec.
Breach Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 958 (S.D. Cal. 2012). It is currently unclear
how much influence this circuit’s precedent had on these decisions and how a
district court in another circuit without this type of precedent would decide a
similar set of facts.
210 In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d. at 1214; In re Sony
Gaming Networks, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 958.
211 See, e.g., Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80–81 (1st Cir. 2012);
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011); Galaria v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 663 (D. Oh. 2014).
212 See, e.g., Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 654 (“Plaintiffs’ contention that an
increased risk of harm constitutes injury-in-fact is similar to the respondent’s
position in Clapper . . . ”).
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information during the breach. This more truly comports with the
Supreme Court’s recognition in Clapper that the plaintiffs in that
case did not have to demonstrate some negative effect stemming
from surveillance, but had to show only the occurrence or
imminent risk of “interception” itself.213 Courts hearing data
breach cases in the future should be careful to recognize that the
real injury to data breach plaintiffs is not some type of expense or
hardship following a data breach but is instead the interception of
information itself. By recognizing this true nature of the injury in
data breach claims, courts can grant data breach plaintiffs the
standing, and the access to the judicial system, to which they are
entitled.
213 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1152 (2013).
